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ProlDably no subject is more discussed among philosophic
thinkers to-day than pragmatism. Its importance must be generally
recognized if for no other reason than that many of the most prom-
inent thinkers are among its advocates. I shall undertake no sys-
tematic account of this movement for it has not yet reached the
proportions of a system. My purpose is simply to discuss some of
its most important aspects as they are set forth in contemporan-
eous writings. I shall confine this discussion to the writings of
leading English and American pragraatlsts, though it must be borne
in mind that this is a widespread movement and that some of its
most able advocates are to be found in Prance and Germany. It
cannot be called a new doctrine. It is merely a shifting into
the focus of consciousness of elements that were always present.
Pragmatism as defined by Peirce in 1879 is the method of
science. It is a rule for attaining clearness in thought and for
determining the value of conceptions. The term is variously un-
derstood by those who use it emd a brief consideration of the
different points of view may help us better to realize the pe-
culiar problems of this doctrine. The conception as originally
enounced is this: 'Consider what effects that might conceivably
have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception
to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our
1. JO. Vol.1, p. 673.
O'
2conception of the object. Thus to develop a thought's meaning we
need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that
conduct is for us its sole significance. There is no difference
of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible dif-
ference in practice.**
Such a rule is easy of application and if it is a true prin-
ciple of the theory of knowledge, promises speedy and certain re-
sults. But its usefulness depends on whether it works, whether
a possible difference in practice will account for the truth of
everything that we hold true. That Peirce regarded it merely as
a maxim - a working hypothesis rather than as an ultimate princi-
___
^
pie is evident from his later writings. "The doctrine appears to
assume that the end of man is action: If it, on the contrary, be
admitted that action wants an end and that end must be something
of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself,
which is that we must look to the upshot of our concepts in
order rightly to apprehend them, would direct us toward some-
thing different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas,
as the true interpreters of our thought. The only ultimate good
which the practical facts to which the maxim directs attention
can subserve is to further the development of conci^ete reason-
ableness; so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any
individual reactions at all, but in the manner in which those re-
actions contribute to that development." This later statement de-
fines a position to which Peirce gives the name pragmaticism or
synechism. The meaning of pragmatism as first expressed by Peirce
is retained by Prof. James, who expresses it more broadly: "The
1. Dictionary of Philosophy Vol.11, p. 322. 2. Jo. Vol.1, p. 674.

effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be
brought down to some particular consequence in our future prac-
tical experience, whether active or passive, the point lying in
the fact that the experience must be particular , than in the
fact that it must be active. I myself have only used the term
pragmatism to indicate a method of carrying on abstract discus-
sion. All that the pragmatic method implies is that truths
should have practical consequences. In England the word has been
used more broadly to cover the notion that the truth of any
statement consists in the consequences and particularly in their
being good consequences. Here we get beyond affairs of method.
And since my pragmatism and this wider pragmatism are so differ-
ent and both are important enough to have different names, I
think Mr, Schiller* s proposal to call the wider pragmatism by the
name of Humanism is excellent and ought to be adopted. The nar-
rower pragmatism may still be spoken of as the pragmatic method."
The Humanism of the Oxford school is a revival of *raan the meas-
ure of all things*. "It takes man for granted as he stands, and
the v;orld of man's experience as it has come to seem to him,"
It is a recognition of the primacy of the will in all human ox-
perience, "Thought with its fruits is an expression of interest,
and the will which evinces and realizes such an interest is more
original and significant than that which the thinking defines.
Such a view attaches peculiar importance to the springs of con-
duct, and in its more systematic development, i.e. Fichte, has re-
s
garded ethics as the true propaedeutic of philosophy," "Pragmatism
j
i
1, Schiller's Humanism p.XVII, 3, Humanism p,XXI,
2. Perry's Approach to Philosophy p,151.

4is the application of Hiimanism to the theory of knowledge. If the
entire man, if h-uman nature as a whole, "be the clue to the theory
of all experience, then human purposiveness must irrigate the
arid soil of logic."
This brings us to the functional view of cognition of Prof.
Dewey. That all our mental life is teleological in character is
the contention of the ^Chicago school*. This view emphasizes the
instrumental character of cognition. Truth and reality are rela-
tive terms. The validity of a thought depends on its fitness for
effecting a transition from a conflicting experience to a rela-
tively stable one.
We may say that pragmatism is an extension of the principle
of evolution to the field of logic and metaphysic. Such concep-
tions as thought, existence, truth, reality, consciousness are
relative to other terms in a movement, development, evolution.
The ultimate thing is the experience. From its modest beginning
as the method of science pragmatism has engendered some new prob-
lems and made necessary a restatement of old ones. The influence
of will upon the determination of reality, the problem of truth
and error, environment, consciousness, experience,- all these have
a new interest in the light of recent discussion. If the pragmatic
method seems best to meet the needs of those writers who call
themselves radical empiricists, it may be interesting to inquire
whether a pluralistic doctrine such as radical empiricism, is the
logical outcome of that method, also whether it is possible to
avoid solipsism. We may consider the problem of Peirce, whether
action or rationality is the goal of evolution.
As it is used to-day pragmatism is recognized as something

5not distinctly new. Mr. Schiller looks to Protagoras as the form-
ulator of the humanistic doctrine of 'man the measure of all
things*. Kant gives us some suggestions of pragmatic doctrine.
Pichte has worked out systematically the primacy of the will in
all experience. Prof. James says that he is only carrying out the
conception of Locke who was the first to use the pragmatic method.
Prof. James here seems to confuse the pragmatic method with em-
piricism. There is great danger of over-interpretation in such
studies and so we v/ill not consider pragmatism historically. We
are chiefly interested in trying to tell what it is, rather than
what its ancestry may have been.
There has "been thus far, no expression that satisfies one's
conjecture as to what philosophic system the pragmatic method
may define. Prof. James says: **If the formula ever becomes canon-
ical it would certainly develop both right-wing and left-wing
interpreters." As yet the movement has not crystallized into its
final form either in England or in America. The general character
of one's philosophy depends on his attitude toward life. His re-
action to experience determines what sort of a world-view will
give him the most satisfaction. If we believe that the purpose
of all thought and action is more action, we may accept pragmatism
as a true evaluation of the meaning of experience. But if we hold
that our conscious life aims at something not different from it-
self, at a rational and harmonious interpretation of the data of
experience, not for the difference it makes in our conduct but
for the intellectual satisfaction it affords, we must then regard
pragmatism as a practical rule, applicable up to a certain point
1, Jo. Vol.11, p. 114.

6but not universally valid.
By common usage the radical empiricism of Prof. James is be-
coming so closely associated with the pragmatic method that we
now call it the pragmatic position, ignoring the fact that Prof.
Royce also uses the ma^im of practical consequences in his dis-
cussions of Absolute Idealism. As a mere method for attaining
clearness in thought it is difficult to see how any philosophic
system could be evolved. Some other assumption is necessary.
Prof. James conceives the world as an indeterminate pluralism, the
clue to the reality of which can be found only in the immediate
experience. "Pure experience" is the postulate of radical empi-
icism. Radical empiricism is the doctrine that immediate experi-
ence, just as it comes to us, contains in itself all the elements
necessary for its own correction or confirmation. It is the real-
ity to which we must return in all our inquiries; it is more ul-
timate than consciousness. Prof. James* accounts of this universal
substance are rather confusing. "Pure experience is the name I
give to the original flux of life before reflexion has categorized
it. Only new-born babes, and persons in semicoma from sleep,
drugs, illnesses or blows can have an experience pTire in the
literal sense of a that which is not yet any definite what, though
ready to be all sorts of whats; full both of oneness and of many-
ness, but in respects that don't appear; chcuiging throughout,
yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points,
either of distinction or of identity can be caught. Pure experi-
ence, in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation."
This is the fundamental reality of Prof. James* world, a
1. Jo. Vol.11, p. 29.

world of such pristine purity that only infants and those whose
minds have momentarily been freed from earthly relations can ex-
perience it» The world of the common man is not "pure experience***
It is the world of interpretat i on of the sensations, which are
considered as mere symbols* Man constructs his universe not out
of sensations but in conformity with the clues which sensation
gives him. It is to these constructs of his own activity that
man attributes reality rather than to the flux and change of his
own feelings.
Prof. James is obliged to assume a secondary sort of pure
experience into which enter all the categories of thought and
i
the individual purposes of the experient, "The notion of a
first in the shape of a most chaotic pure experience, which sets
us questions, of a second in the way of fundamental categories
long ago wrought into the structure of our consciousness and
practically irreversible, which define the general frame within
which answers must fall, and of a third which gives the detail
of the answers in the shapes most congruous with all our present
needs, is the essence of the humanistic conception,"
Thus any bit of pure experience includes the interpretation
of the sensation not only in accordance with the laws of con-
sciousness in general but also congruously with the interests
and beliefs of the individual. Reality is that construction that
is most in harmony with our own purposes. Not only our percepts
but also our conceptual manifolds, memories, fancies are primarily
"ST
bits of pure experience. As Prof. James expresses it: "The in-
stant field of the present is at all times pure experience, plain
1, Mind Vol.XXIX. p.461. 2. Jo. Vol.1. p,485.

8unqualified actuality or existence, a simple that ***
The pure experience is not a judgment. There is no subject
or predicate. Judgment and objectivity arise when there is a ccn-
flict of habits of reaction. Each experience, in the moment of its
being is simple. There is no differentiation of thought and thing
in that instant. That differentiation, if it comes at all, comes
later when the unity of the experience is divided into two ab-
stractions, the thought of an object and the object thought of.
Consciousness is not a primary datum but something that comes by
the analysis of a reality complete in itself.
Such a conception is in direct contradiction to the humanis-
tic doctrine which denies any duality between reality and thougpit.
According to Humanism thought does not somehow represent a real-
ity that is independent of cognition. We are not aware of any
reality except by its existence in our thought. We cannot get at
reality except by knowing it. *We know the Real as it is when we,
know it ; we know nothing whatever about what it is apart from
that process. When the mind knows reality both are affected as
when a stone falls both it and the earth are attracted." Con-
trast this position with that of Prof. Dewey who says that there
are many sorts of experiences - all real, and cognition is just
one sort. Surely we have here a world of reality that is not
known, although of course it may become so. In Prof. James* phil-
osophy a later experience knows the former. The first experience
is real when it *is* i.e. during its one moment of being. After
that it ceases to be. Radical empiricism gives us a system of re-
alities outside OUT knowledge and independent of the knowing
1.Humanism p. 11.

9function. Moreover we never know the reality. That is mutilated
at thought's touch and breaks into pieces. Such a notion is tan-
talizing to the truth-seeker and satisfies us as little as Kant* s
thing-in-itself which it rssemblos in a surprising degree.
Before considering the nature of pure experience any fur-
ther, it will he necessary to make clear the function of cogni-
tion as understood by the pragmatists. For no metaphysical prob-
lem csin be settled independently of the epistemological one. The
pragmatists emphasize the teleological character of thought. The
unitary first experience becomes known only when it seems to in-
volve two different modes of reaction. Thought arises in the ef-
fort to harmonize the conflict. It is the instrment for effec-
ting a harmonious readjustment. As long as there is no uncertain-
ty about the manner of discharge, experience flows along from
moment to moment without any call for reflection. Consciousness
is an addition to the reality of experience and has been intro-
duced to explain the fact that things not only are but are
known. But this condition of *knownness* is better explained,
according to radical empiricism, by the relations subsisting be-
tween things. And these relations are themselves experienced.
There is a continuity actually felt between the experience
known and the experience that knows it - a certain drift which,
without break or gap points toward and may evolve into the
'knower*. Prof. James here seems to mean a temporal unity. But
this feeling of the unity of experience does not come from the
felt continuity. It depends on a unity thought into the process,
on rationality.
Prof. James* account of the evolution of thought is as fol-
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lows: "This 'pen* is, in its first intention, a bald that , a da-
t-um, fact, phenomenon, content, or whatever other neutral or am-
hig-uous name you may prefer to apply. I call it a pure experience.
Just what, from heinF 'piire*, does its "becoming conscious mean?
It means, first, that new experiences have supervened; and
second, that they have borne a certain assignable relation to the
unit supposed. Continue to speak of the pure unit as the 'pen*.
So far as the pen's successors do but repeat the pen or being
different from it, are 'energetically* related to it, it and
they form a group of stably existing physical things. So far,
however, as its successors differ from it in another well-deter^
mined way, the pen will figure in their context, not as a physic-
al, but as a mental fact. It will become a passing *percept*, m;^
percept of that pen. What now is that decisive, well-determined
way?
The continuous identity of each personal consciousness is
a name for the practical fact that new experiences come which
look back on the old ones, find them *warm* and greet and appro-
priate them as *mine*. These operations mean when analyzed em-
pirically, several tolerably definite things, viz:
1. That the new experience has past time for its * content*,
and in that time a pen that *was*;
2. That warmth was about the pen, in the sense of a group
of feelings, 'interest* aroused, * attention* turned, 'eyes' em-
ployed, etc., that were closely connected with it and that now
recur and evermore recur with unbroken vividness, though from
the pen of now which may be only an image, all such vividness
may have gone;
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3. That these feelings are the nucleus of 'me';
4. That whatever was once associated with them was, at least
for that one moment, 'mine' - my implement if associated with
hand-feelings, my 'percept* only, if only eye-feelings and at-
tention-feelings were involved.
The pen, realized in this retrospective way as my percept,
thus figures as a fact of 'conscious' life. But it does so only
so far as 'appropriation' has occurred; and appropriation is par t
of the content of e later experience wholly additional to the
originally 'pure* pen. That pen, virtually both objective and
subjective, is at its own moment actually and intrinsically
neither. It has to be looked back upon and used , in order to be
classed in either distinctive way. But its use, so called, is in
the hands of the other experience, while it stands throughout
the operation, passive and unchanged.
The next question is how an experience, originally pure,
might conceivably enter into two minds. Obviously no nev/ kind of
condition would have to be supplied. All that we shoxild have to
postulate would be a second subsequent experience, collateral
and contemporary with the first subsequent experience, in which
a similar act of appropriation should occur. The two acts would
interfere neither with one another nor with the originally pure
pen. It would sleep undisturbed in its own past, no matter how
many successors went through their several appropriative acts.
Each would know it as 'my' percept, each would class it as a 'con-
scious' fact.
The paradox of the same experience figuring in two conscious-
nesses seems no paradox at all. To be 'conscious' means not sinqply
to be, but to be reported, known, to have awareness of one's
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being added to thct being; and this is just what happens v/hen
the appropriative experience supervenes. The pen experience in
its original immediacy is not aware of itself, it simply is, and
the second experience is required for what we call awareness of
it to occiir.
Even although 'feeling only is as it is felt*, there is
still nothing absurd in the notion of its being felt in two dif-
ferent ways at once, as yours, namely, and as mine. It is indeed
•mine' only as it is felt as mine, and *yours* only as it is
felt as yours. But it is felt as neither b£ itself , but only
when 'owned* by our several remembering experiences, just as one
undivided estate is owned by several heirs.
A fact of consciousness exists but once and is a state. Its
esse is sentiri ; it is only so far as it is felt; and it is unam-
biguously and unequivocally exactly what is felt."
The plausibility of this position arises from the ambiguity
of the term experience. Experience without an experient is some-
thing so nev/ that it certainly deserves a new name instead of
trying to gain recognition for itself under such difficulties.
Experience means a relation and it is not easy to understand the
relation when there are no terms to be related. It involves the
idea of subject and object, yet Prof. James* *world-stuff * has
neither.
But there are other difficulties than those arising from
the previous meaning of the najne. Pure experience has no existence,
it simply is. After its one little moment of life it is succeeded
by another experience. "It sleeps iindisturbed in its own past.**
1. Jo. Vol. p. 181.
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Even such a statement is misleading for the experience does not
even sleep. It has literally passed away. We should not say, then,
that it*stands passive and unchanged*. It has no such metaphysical
existence. And in so describing it Prof. James treats experience
as a sort of entity instead of as an event in an evolution.
The most serious difficulty is that *pure experience' is
entirely subjective. The individual can know only his own past
states. The feeling of sameness between sensations is the origin
of the knowledge experience. The first sensation is *dumb* but
a succeeding one finds the 'warmth* of the first and feels a
relationship. This feeling of intimacy is the nucleus of the me»
In other words it is avmre of the first and calls it its own.
The continuity of the transition from the first to the later ex-
perience is the essence of personal consciousness. But this con-
tinuity is not felt between minds. 'There is no obvious transition
from one mind to another. You have to step off and get on again."
So the pure experience cannot be felt as continuous between minds
at all. To be known by different minds it would have to be a
something existing outside the individual stream of consciousness
which could be appropriated by any one. Even then there would be
no felt 'warmth' because of which he could call it his 'own'.
There is no continuous transition here. It would require a salto
mortale to enter into conscious relations with such an absolute.
The notion that a feeling is neither yours nor mine except
as it is so felt is absurd if it means that it exists as a dis-
embodied feeling. A feeling is an event and that particular e-
vent can happen only in definitely determined relations to other
1. Jo. Vol.1, p. 684.
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events in the series. It does not exist out of relation to the
personal consciousness. A feeling may not be conscious that it
belongs to me, yet as an unique feeling its character determines
its owner. Another person cannot become conscious of it. Because
the pure experience is *dumb* as to its owner we cannot infer
that it could become the content of the later experience of any
one. My pure experience of the pen can no more become the content
of your later experience than the pure pen can become a physical
book. The pure experience is definite enough to determine what
physical object will evolve and definite enough also, to deter-
mine whose experience it is. It was not a physical pen until the
later experience supervened. Neither was it known as mjr experience
until the later one. Yet it never could have belonged to anyone
else when once the question of ovmership was raised. "It is un-
ambiguously and unequivocally exactly what is felt." It is felt
as a step in a stream of consciousness which I term mine. Psy-
chologically I never get outside that stream. The postulate of
radical empiricism has no meaning outside the experience of the
individual who uses it.
Prof. James* reference to the undivided estate is not per-
tinent. It would seem from this that the world is a dualism of
subject and object, a theory which Prof. James seeks to refute.
Moreover it is expressly stated that the estate is not unowned,
as he affirms the pure experience is. Finally the question is not
whether tv/o or more minds know the same thing, but how they
know it. And the 'undivided estate' does not give us any clue to
the solution of this problem.
The inconsistency of this doctrine becomes clearer the more
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one considers it, "Surely all these, one time and on space,
etc., were once definite conquests made at historic dates by our
ancestors in their attempts to get the chaos of their crude in-
dividual experiences into a more shareable and manageable shape.
Obviously the chaotic pure experience is not 'shareable'. It is
not a *that* of so indefinite a character that it may be appro-
priated by anyone. It is the experience of an individual.
Again Prof. James says: "If*' one and the same experience
can figure twice, once in a mental and once in a physical con-
text, one does not see why it might not figure thrice or four
times, by running into as many different mental contexts. Abol-
ishing any number of contexts would not destroy the experience
Itself or its other contexts." Here we have the pure experience
living its life unrelated to other bits of experience. It has
an existence rather than an 'istence. Yet we have been told
that pure experience is in a constant flux changing from moment
to moment. In the account of how one mind knows, experience is a
process. When two minds know one thing, experience is apparently
an object. 'Pure experience' tnen seems to be not experience at
all, but a permanent possibility of experience. This is quite a
different thing from the 'continuous transition' actually felt
and noted.
The anomolous character of pure experience is shown very
clearly in Prof. James' treatment of space. His notion of how
two minds can know one thing involves the notion of a real space
in which the thing is. He seems to give to space an objectivity
and independence quite above that of the things in it. "The dis-
1. Mind Vol.XXIX. p. 461. 2. Jo. Vol.1, p. 566.
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covery of one Time and one Space," "The^ receptacle of certain
of our experiences being thus coininon." Now real space as a "sin-
gle continuous receptacle" gives an ultimate duality of knov^er
and thing known. Such cornmon-sense realism is a pood starting
point for metaphysical inquiries but can never be a satisfactory
conclusion,
"No points of difference appearing, they, your space and
mine, would have to coimt as the same," This is begging the
question, which is whether my mind knov^s your objects. Obviously
if we can compare our objects we have already admitted that we
can know them. So the "identity of indiscernibles" cannot help
to prove the identity of your objects and mine*
The doctrine of the extension of ideas is an interesting
bit of imaginative writing. "The"^ difference between objective
and subjective extension is one of relation to a context solely.
The two worlds differ, not by the presence or absence of exten-
sion, but by the relations of the extensions which in both
worlds exist. The general group of experiences that act, comes
inevitably to be contrasted with the group whose members, having
identically the same natures, fail to manifest them in the 'en-
ergetic* way," One is tempted to ask how we know that their na-
tures are the same since they act differently or we react to them
6
differently. The foundation of pragmatism is that "Our idea of
anything is our idea of its sensible effects. What a thing means
is simply what habits it involves." Now for a pragmatist to say
1, Mind Vol.XXIX. p. 461, 2, Jo, Vol.1, p. 568,
3. Jo. Vol, I, p,568. 4, Jo, Vol, I. p,488.
5, Pop. Sc, Mo. Vol,XII, p,292.
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that two things are the same but they act differently, is non-
sense. If physical space is the *real space', consistency seems
to require that we call mental space unreal, that is , non-ex-
istent and that we no longer try to identify the natures of the
two.
Pragmatism does not wish to commit itself to any statement
regarding the nature of the causes that have determined experi-
ence as we knov; it now. It does not admit that there is any
question of environment. It seems to think that the chaotic pure
experience is the purely determinable. "Reality is an accumu-
lation of our ovm intellectual inventions." One does not see how
to interpret this other than as subjective idealism. If we have
created the world out of nothing, it is difficult to imagine how
the process started since in the beginning there wcs no definite
situation needing adjustment. Cognition could never originate
in an absolute chaos. The doctrine 'that nature is responsive
to our choice' is imdoubtedly true, the only question is, how
far is it responsive? Pragmatism says that we can only find out
by trying. "If nature suffers the addition" must mean that nature
is not responsive unless we choose aright. She is independent
of our wishes. "There^ is a push, an urgency, against which we
are on the whole powerless." From such a statement it is diffi-
cult to see the difference between pragmatism and realism.
Pragmatism is \mdecided as to whether the limits are due to
past experiences or to an "extra-experiential Ding-an-sich." This
agnosticism toward the question of the ultimate nature of environ-
ment is characteristic of the pragmatic position that whatever
1. Mind vol,XXIX. p.462 2. Mind Vol./JCIX. p. 463.
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makes no difference in the matter of conduct is a useless sub-
ject of dispute. It admits that experience has a definite char-
acter now, we cannot make of it ju.st v/hat we will, "but this in-
dependence is due to pest experience. For pragmatism, there is
no extra-experiential Reality v/hich determines o-ur experiences.
In a world where "experience and reality come to the spme thing"
there is no need of seeking outside our ovm or He racial experi
ences a clue to the understanding of those experiences.
It would seem that there could be little difficulty in
stating the pragmatic conception of truth and reality. But there
is considerable difficulty in trying to harmonize all that has
been said. Prof. Dewey gives a very clear statement of what the
radical empiricist means by truth and reality. Every experience
is real; our dreams, our fancies, our "out and out illusions" as
7/ell as our experiences of mathematical truths are reals of pre
cisely the same sort. One is not more real than another. What is
unreal is non-existent, that is, it has never been experienced
and GO cannot possibly be a matter of concern to us.
From the point of view of the psychologist this is the na-
ture of reality. As psychical events there can be no dispute
about the reality of any and every experience. But such a con-
ception is obviously solipsistic and is barren of any signifi-
cance in logic or metaphysics where the endeavor is to eliminate
the subjective factor. Though reality is met with only in indi-
dual experiences, yet there is an aspect of experience other than
the subjective. The question of meanin,T cannot be settled with-
out going outside the individual experience. This confusion of
psychical reality with the remlity of the logician has resulted
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in much misunderstanding.
Prof, Dewey's experience of the half-awakened sleeper is
undoubtedly a psychical real. But if, as Prof, Leighton suggests,
he mistake a coil of hot pipes for a couch he would be inclined
to assert that the first experience was not "as good a real as
the self-luminous vision of an Absolute*' because it was not as
useful. What philosophy seeks to define is not the reality of
mental states. No one questions that. The search is for that
which will enable us to meet the future forearmed. We use the
word to designate what we conceive to be the nature of our en-
vironment, whether physical, social or spiritual. That is real
of which we must take account in our effort to adjust ourselves
to the. rest of the universe. Whatever forces us to reckon with
itself, to that we attribute reality. That this reality is never
met v/ith except in individual experience is true, yet my individ-
ual experience does not constitute its reality in this larger
sense
•
Frof . Dewey calls that experience true which is most useful
in defining our expectation. Reality resides in the immediate
experience. Truth comes by a comparison of one experience with
another by evaluating them congruously with our needs. Thus truth
is not a static term. It evolves just as does reality. Everything
real, v/hether being or relation is a matter of experience.
There is no eternally constant Absolute - no fixed reality to
which truth must conform.
Prof, James' use of the term real is so varied that it is
difficult to state hi-s idea. While accepting the conception of
Prof, Dewey his use of the term is more like that of the common-
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sense realist. Perhaps this is due to his desire to be untech-
nical but it certainly leads to confusion.
In the Experience of Activity Prof, James expresses the
pragmatic conception of the identity of reality and experience.
•'Nothing shall be admitted as fact except v/hat can be experi-
enced at some definite time by some experient. Everything real
must be experienced, and every kind of thing experienced must
somewhere be real. A philosophy of pure experience can consider
the real causation as no other nature of thing than that which
even in our most erroneous experiences appears to be at work.*'
This is in accordance with Prof. Dewey. But what does he mean by
'the real experiences get sifted from the mental ones"? "An
experience must conform to reality in order to be true." The real
world of physical things. "With^ real objects consequences always
accrue." "Reality^ is an accumulation of our own intellectual
inventions." This last would seem to indicate that pure experi-
ence is a symbol which suggests to us an interpretation. This
interpretation is a product of the intellect - a notion at vari-
ance with the idea that reality is a postulate of the will. A-
gain "By reality humanism means nothing more than the other
conceptual or perceptual experiences with which a given present
experience may find itself in point of fact mixed up." This mix-
ture of the realities of psychology, logic, common-sense and
metaphysics in a philosophical discussion makes the pragmatic
position rather vague. In general v/e may say that reality as the
pragmatist conceives it is independent of our individual thought
1. Psy. R. Vol.XII. p. 3.
3.Mind Vol. XXIX. p.474.
2* Jo. Vol. I. p. 489.
4.Mind Vol.X^.IX. p. 462.
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but not of htunan thought. "To say that our thought does not
*make' this reality means pragmatically that if our ovm partic-
ular thought were annihilated the reality would still be there,
though possibly it might be there in a shape that would lack
something that our thought supplies. That reality is 'indepen-
dent* means that there is something in every experience that
escapes our arbitrary control. There is a push, an urgency within
our very experience against which we are on the whole powerless,
and which drives us in a direction that is the destiny of our
belief."
In the chapter on the 'Perception of Reality* Prof. James
says that an object^ must appear both interesting and important
for our emotional and active life, to be real. We believe in the
reality of those things that we need. So reality means value or
the Good. Truth and reality have their origin in the will not
in the intellect. We hold those things real which have an inter-
est and value for us. It is onlj^ thus that they may become ob-
jects of our thought. As soon as their interest for us lapses
their reality no longer has a claim on us. For us it does not
exist. In moments of decision what seems better for our needs
is believed real. Thus we can choose our reality. There is no
absolute reality existing outside all experience, out of re-
lation. to our emotional nature. Reality is the valuation we put
upon certain phases of experience v/hich appear of most worth.
The pragmatic account of the origin of our notion of reality
does not exhaust the meaning of that term for us. Its origin is
in the individual experience but its meaning must transcend that.
1. Mind Vol.XXIX. p. 463. 2. Jam.es' Psychology Vol.11, p. 295.
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The pragmatist says that v/hatever he desires to be real, of that
he affirms reality and there is nothing else in our notion of
reality. But experience shov/s us that man's nature is much more
complex. He has many needs and the satisfaction of some of them
is incompatible with that of others. Ho needs a standard to eval-
uate even his needs . Pragmatism gives no adequate account of the
normative mode of thought.
One of the most fundamental needs is that of his social
nature, that others shall see reality as he does. To satisfy
this need he ignores many others. But the deepest need of all
is for a reality that is independent of the individual or of
society. So, even by the pragmatic test we find that reality is
independent of subjective interests, for that is the sort of re-
ality the individual needs. But such a conception refutes prag-
matism. It is, in truth, the essence of Absolute Idealism.
Truth for the pragmatist is a relation subsisting, not be-
tween our thought and something external, but between different
parts of our experience. Anything is true which is in harmony
with the rest of our experience. One thing depends on another
for corroboration but the world of experience does not depend
on anything else. It is self-sufficient. Truth is not a copy
of a reality that exists outside experience. It may be outside
our own experience, "a legacy of the past" but it is a human
creation. As individuals we do not make reality, we submit to it.
But in the evolution of the race this permanent structure of re-
ality has grov/n with the needs of the people. This "inherited"
experience is the only reality to which truth must conform. The
necessity which hems us in at all times is our need, coupled
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with the relatively permanent structiare of accianulated. mental
inventions* So we seem alv/ays to be driven - never free to choose
one way of thinking rather than another. Thus arose the notion
of a reality independent of experience to which truth must con-
fom,
"Pragmatism is the doctrine that the whole me8.ning of a
doctrine expresses itself in practical consequences, either con-
duct to he recommended or experience to be expected if the con-
ception is true which would be different if it were untrue."
Pragmatism holds that the only reason we desire to attain truth
is that v/e may better foresee the future and adapt ourselves to
it. All our thought activities are subordinate to some other end.
While admitting that this accounts for the origin of thought,
rationalism insists that the attainment of truth is its own re-
ward. Most of the advanced scientific inquiry has for its sole
aim the satisfaction of the intellect. Rationality, not action
OS the goal of man's endeavor.
The notion that *truth must have practical consequences'
seems unwarrented. The scientist must assume that there is e
truth apart from its effect on conduct. He cannot determine the
truth of his theory by waiting until he finds what difference it
would make in conduct. It is not obvious just what difference in
-
our conduct many of the truths of higher mathematics make. Sci-
ence, too, has made discoveries of truth that have not yet been
found useful. In view of these facts pragmatism has modified its
j
conception of truth, and, while still maintaining that utility
j
«
is the origin of the truth experience, it admits the just claims
of those truths that' have been discovered in the search for mere
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intellectual satisfaction. Thus 'useful' now means not 'conduct'
alone but intellectual activity. It is recognized that one of
man's activities is thinking. "An intrinsic interest in the "bare
describing function has grown up. We wish accounts that shall be
true, whether they bring collateral profit or not." Here pragmar-
tism recognizes that intellectual activity is not a means but an
end in itself. Pragmatism attempted to deny any intellectual
needs apart from the emotional and active needs. But this did not
give due consideration to the scientific love of truth for truth's
saJsie. The last quoted statement from 'Humanism and Truth' admits
the existence of a truth independent of the subjective factor of
interest. And this is the contention of Absolute Idealism which
pragmatism aims to supplant.
"A^ fact and a theory have not different natures, the one
being objective, the other subjective. They are both made of the
same experience-material and their difference relates to their
way of functioning solely. It is 'fact' when it functions stead-
ily; it is theory when we hesitate." It may be admitted that a
true theory and a false one are not different subjectively con-
sidered. Their difference is in their objective reference. But
on the merely subjective side there is no question of truth. V/e
need to distinguish between the merit of a theory and my holding
a theory true. A theory may deserve to be believed even when no
one believes it. By truth we mecn the claim of a proposition to
be believed. I am not able to make a theory false or true by my
rejection or acceptance. The law of gravitation "functions stead-
ily" no matter v/hether I accept it or "hesitate" to accept it.
1. Mind Vol. XXIX. p.470. 2. ^'sy. B. Vol.1, p. 4.
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A philosophy of pure experience should consider the physical
T/orld of the same rank as the mental. My thought of an event has
not more reality than the physical event. It is a fallacy to con-
sider my truth experience valid and not to consider the fact to
which it points valid in the same degree.
The whole discussion is the problem of Hume over again -
whether we are justified in making ary assumption regarding the
meaning of our changing states of consciousness. Even if there
were a reality outside experience, pragmatism says, we can know
nothing of it and therefore truth for us is merely a relation
subsisting betv/een our thoughts. The remark of Prof. Taylor is a
pertinent criticism upon this position. "Though true proposi-
tions are, so far as we know, only thought by individual minds,
yet the notion of an individual thinking mind is absolutely ir-
relevant to the explanation of what we mean by their truth. The
truth of a proposition is a function of its meaning, not of its
character as a psychological event or process."
It may be interesting to note the similarity of the prag-
matic position and positivism. The doctrine of cause as expressed
by Prof. James might have been written by Hume. "A philosophy
of pure experience can consider the real causation as no other
nature of thing than that which even in our most erroneous experi-
ences appears to be at work." A criticism of this view of cause
is unnecessary in this paper, as it would lead us too far into
the history of philosophy. But we may say in general that hu-
man thoiight makes a distinction between a psychic event and the
meaning of that event. The question of truth does not apply to
1. Phil. R. Vol.XV. p. 267. 2. Psy. R. Vol.XII. p. 14.
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the former. Much of the present-day discussion and misunderstand-
ing has been due to a confusion of the notions.
If truth is what a man *troweth* with the greatest satis-
faction to himself, there is no sense in talking of error. Error
could only he some thought that had satisfied him at some other
time or had satisfied some one else. The criterion of satis-
faction would involve an infinite number of *true* judgments
about the same thing at the same time. Such a view of the nature
of truth does not give the maximum of 'satisfaction* and so may
be considered untrue unless it happens to please one to think
in that way.
One does not see how to reconcile the pragmatic position
and certain statements in the article. Humanism and Truth. "Prag-
matically, virtual and actual truth mean the same thing. A fact
virtually preexists v;hen every condition of its realization save
one - in this case the thinking mind - is already there. The stars
themselves dictate the result - of the counting. Something comes
by the counting. Yet that something was always true .** How can
we interpret this other than that truth is, true no matter whether
it exists in the mind of some individual or not? If this is so,
pragmatism and Absolute Idealism do not differ in their concep-
tion of the nature of truth.
Before giving an estimate of the value of pragmatism we
will consider briefly some aspects of the movement in England.
Mr. Schiller is the avowed champion of the doctrine there and
may be considered the founder of the 'Oxford School'. His vol-
ume of essays entitled 'Kiamanism' will be the basis of this re-
2. Mind Vol.XXIX. p.475 & p.475.
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view,
Mr. Schiller gives the name. Humanism to his doctrine which
is somewhat broader in its claims than the radical empiricism
of Prof. James and Prof, Dewey. Mr. Schiller's discussions are
largely concerned with the nattire of truth and reality. The basis
of his epistemological and metaphysical doctrines. is ethics.
Radical empiricism has said there is no truth or reality outside
the individual human experience. Humanism goes further and makes
purpose the essence of truth and reality. There can be no knowl-
edge apart from a desire and attempt to know. Reality is the af-
firmation of our volitional nature. There is no unknown reality,
no undiscovered truth. The human element is necessary to make
reality real.
Every human activity is purposive in character. Truth and
reality are the useful aspects of experience. Truth means true
from what point of view, real for v/hat purpose. There is no
thing- in-itself. Everything that 'is' is tinged with self-inter-
est. Pure intellection is a fiction; it does not exist in our
world. "Our knowing is driven by our interests."
It is true that we 'know' because we need to. Yet humanism
fails to show v/hy we need some things and not others. Surely this
points to some sort of correspondence or relation between our
needs and reality, that is not entirely dependent on the human
will. May not reality determine our needs as logically as our
needs reality? And is not that what we mean by reality - that it
determines facts?
"Truth is that manipulation of objects which turns out upon
l.H\M3anism p. 61.
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trial to be useful, primarily for any human end, "but ultimately
for that perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final
aspiration." Humanism thus assumes that rationality is the goal
of human endeavor. All our activity is based on the faith that
human action makes a difference in the reality of the universe.
"At bottom rationality itself is the supremest postulate of
Faith and the demands of 'Faith' must be as reasonable as those
of the 'Reason' they pervade." There is really little meaning in
this statement. If faith postulates rationality it is nonsense
to speak of the reasonableness of faith in postulating it. More-
over v;e may question the statement that Rationality is a postu-
late of Faith. Genetically at least, we could not say that it is*
The infant does not have an innate faith out of v/hich develops
his craving for rationality. Such a doctrine would imply a faculty
of* believing; There is no reason to believe that faith is prior
to rationality. Both are elements of our psychic life and should
be considered of equal rank.
Humanism, emphasizes the individual experience. 'Man is the
measure of all things.' If we take the individual man's experi-
ence as the criterion this doctrine is solipsistic and pragma-
tism should claim no affinity with it. For an individual standard
gives no basis for ethics or conduct, which is the ultimate cate-
gory for pragmatism. If, on the other hand, by 'man the measure
of all things', pragmatism means humanity, v/e are dealing with
an abstraction and the boast of humanism is empty.
For most of us experience has no meaning if it does not
involve a reality that is not purely subjective and individual.
1. Humanism p. XIV.
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Reality is not entirely anthropomorphic. It does not depend en-
tirely on the theory of knowledge* "If we question Nature amiss"
implies a determinate character to which our human truth must
conform. If it were otherwise why "must" we "try again"? It is
subjective idealism to say that value determines truth. The truth
is valuable to us not because it happens to be in line with our
interests but because it is independent of our wishes or those
of any one else. Truth conditions value, not value truth. In his
search for truth the scientist endeavors to eliminate the subjec-
tive factor. If metaphysics ever becomes a science it must have
some more stable basis than the changing interests of the indi-
vidual.
Mr. Schiller starts from a basis of individual experience
but slips into the notion of human experience as if humanity as
a whole had a concrete experience. His notion of conduct as the
basis of the True and the Real becomes transformed into the con-
cept of the Good. Yet the category of the Good is not a fact of
experience. The Good, in this sense, is a metaphysical reality,
it is not conduct. Nor can we say that it is more fundamental
than Truth and Reality. Such a doctrine is individualistic; and
those concepts, if they have any meaning are universals. The ex-
altation of the individual and the degradationof truth and real-
ity to mere creatures of his passing interest can lead only to
skepticism.
Much of the humanistic doctrine is a quibble over words and
a striving to get hold of something new. There is also much mis-
understanding of other points of view. The humanist assumes that
1. Humanism p. 11.
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"usefulness is the test of truth and then accuses the idealist
of inconsistency because he holds that there is a truth that
does not depend on human interest,
|
Moreover humanism itself conceives the immediate experience
as a symbol" of something ulterior. Why need we say that the ,
* something* is just more human experience? The immediate experi-
ence must always be the basis of our notion of reality but it is
not 'reality'. And since humanism itself goes beyond the immedi-
ate experience in its interpretation of the symbol, are we not i
justified in holding that reality is more than human experiences?
In drawing our conclusions concerning pragmatism we must
bear in mind that, as yet, it is only a movement, and it is im-
possible to estimate its value before we know v/hat final form it
villi taJce, V/e can only indicate its tendencies so far as they
reveal themselves. The doctrine seems full of contradictions,
but there has not yet been any systematic exposition of its prin-'i
ciples. Perhaps in Prof, James' long-awaited Metaphysics all the
inconsistency will be smoothed away. Thus far either he has not
|
succeeded in making himself understood or else his doctrine has
j
some radical inconsistencies which will need eliminating before
pragmatism can claim to be a philosophic system,
|
The previous discussions indicate the general criticism to
be made upon pragmatism. Starting with the method of science it
attempts to formulate a logic and metaphysic. But the method and
the assumptions of psychology do not fit the problems of meta-
physics any more than did the propositions and demonstrations of
geometry in the Cartesian system. Metaphysics is unique, and can-
1, Humanism p,193. .
||
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not iDorrow her method from others without committing herself to
assumptions that make impossible the solution of her problems.
For psychology the individual experience is the final word in •
questions of truth, reality and goodness. But a system of phil-
osophy committed to such a principle cannot escape subjective
idealism. And it is unnecessary to consider the unsatisfactori-
ness of such a position.
Pragmatism makes the mistake of thinking that telling the
origin of our notions of tru.th and reality explains what they
are. But the philosophic wonder is not so easily satisfied. Pos-
itivism will never be popular • We like to speculate about the
nature of the 'beyond', and a philosophy which ignores that prob
lem does not fulfill its calling. An agnostic philosophy is a
contradiction in terms. Moreover the persistence of the metaphys
ical disposition from the earliest ages points to its utility in
the evolutionary process in some way. Pragmatism must give an
expression to its conception of what determines human experience
Its doctrines do not seem capable of being interpreted monisti-
cally . There are really tv/o terms although pragmatism has given
an account of only one.
Pragmatism justly emphasizes the element of faith in all
human activity. But it seems rather inconsistent to rail at Abso
lute Idealism for its faith in the ideals of truth and reality.
Faith is an ingredient of all our interpretations of the given.
We can only postulate the uniformity of nature. The difference
between science and philosophy is not in the presence or absence
of faith. Since all human knowledge is the fruit of the 'will to
believe' pragmatism should be the last to give up faith in a
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reality not *kno\m'.
Pragmatism is valuable in that it emphasizes the reality of
the immediate experience. The tendency of rationalism has "been
to eliminate from philosophy the more changing aspects of experi-
ence, making reality synonomous with universality, Locke, al-
though an empiricist, does not regard all experience of equal
reality. Color, sound, taste and smell are almost entirely sub-
jective. The pragmatist is right in saying that, as experiences ,
they are just as real as form and extension. It is in the im-
mediate experience that we must find the origin of reality. But
this does not prevent our attributing an even higher reality to
our interpretation of the immediate experience. Humanism is in-
clined to over-emphasize the importance of the will and the emo-
tions in this interpretation. Moreover this need of interpreting
the unsatisfactory immediate experience is characteristic of ide-
alism rather than the realism to which pragmatism claims rela-
tionship.
The continual emphasis on the purposive character of thought,
truth, reality and consciousness suggests the question of whither
does this evolution tend. The pragmatist cannot consistently
place his goal outside the process. We find suggestions of pan-
psychism scattered through Prof. James* and Mr. Schiller*
s
writings, and it is along that line that vie may expect pragmatism
to develop.
That tendency in pragmatism, which we have criticised most
severely is also the phase most worthy of praise. Its individu-
alistic implications, v/hen carried to the extreme, are untenable.
But they represent a healthy reaction against the extreme ration-
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alism of the Neo-Hegelians, Intellectual ism had ignored the feel-
ings and will. Preigmatism tends to ignore the intellect. What-
ever our ultimate system of philosophy may he, it must give due
consideration to every phase of man' life. Neither rationalism
nor pragmatism does this.
Prof. James* work is valuable from the standpoint of descrip-;|
tive psychology, hut as a system of philosophy it is lacking in
breadth. The multiplicity of detail is not unified into any sys- '
tem. The business of philosophy is with generalizations. The lo-
cal and the accidental must be ignored. This is true, in a de-
gree, of all our thinking. We think with concepts rather than
!
with percepts. The highest generalization possible is the goal
of our thought. Though philosophy may lack in the freshness of
its material, yet it deals with reality in that it is an attempt '
to satisfy our very real need of a rational universe.
j
Pragmatism is a doctrine for the young. It is a philosophy '
of activity, of striving and accomplishing, of satisfying our
needs and of meJiing the universe conform to our desires. Man is
greater than all else, and his will rulos all that can enter into
his life.
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